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Prevention of Unplanned Explosions
at Munitions Sites in Tajikistan
Poorly stored stockpiles of aging munitions continue to pose threats in Tajikistan. Since 2009, the
Fondation Suisse de Déminage (the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action or FSD) has worked with
Tajikistan’s Ministries of Defense and Interior and its border guards to dispose of surplus weapons
and munitions. These efforts were funded by the government of the Netherlands and the Office of
Weapons Removal and Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA).

by Artyom Harutyunyan and Ramzia Mamadnazarova [ Swiss Foundation for Mine Action, Tajikistan ]

W

ith the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the
early 1990s, former Soviet republics inherited
vast amounts of Soviet weaponry from military

units previously stationed in these now independent republics. Three of these countries, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan, served as staging points for Soviet forces during
the invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s and produced and
maintained considerable stocks of Soviet weapons and munitions. When Tajikistan entered into civil war in 1992, these
former Soviet armories (still occupied by idle Soviet units)
served as a major source of small arms for both government
and opposition forces. Other sources of small arms came from
high-ranking local law enforcement officers who appropriated
the weapons available to them, as well as from Afghanistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Uzbekistan.1
When the war ended in 1997, thousands of tons of munitions were left unguarded in makeshift storage sites, many of
which were forgotten. Today, the munitions stored in these
abandoned caches continue to decay, increasing the likelihood of unplanned explosions. Moreover, these caches,
some of which include weapons such as mortars, heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles, have reportedly been
targeted by criminals and militant extremists and pose a serious security threat to the Tajikistani people.2
Although demilitarization programs operated across the
country during and after the civil war, recent clashes in Tavildara (2009), Gharm (2010) and Khorugh (2012) with armed
Small arms ammunition being destroyed in an incinerator.
Photo courtesy of Artyom Harutyunyan/FSD.
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groups show that citizens continue to possess a considerable
amount of small arms and light weapons (SA/LW).3,4,5

Cluster munitions for destruction.
Photo courtesy of Magali Koenig/FSD.

nitions can only be solved by separating them from stable mu-

Unplanned Explosions

A survey conducted by the Small Arms Survey indicates a

nitions and disposing of the unstable munitions.

more than two-fold increase in unplanned explosions at munitions sites globally since 1987, with 69 events from 1987–

Weapons and Ammunitions Disposal

1996 and 194 events from 1997–2006. Although there are no

In 2003, the Fondation Suisse de Déminage (the Swiss

official statistics available, there was at least one unplanned

Foundation for Mine Action or FSD) signed a memorandum

explosion in Tajikistan in 2009 caused by handling errors and

of agreement, which the Majlisi Oli (Tajikistan’s Supreme As-

poor working practices.7

sembly) ratified on 20 June 2003. Tajikistan’s inability to prop-
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While unplanned explosions tend to originate from me-

erly secure and maintain its munitions sites alerted FSD of the

chanical and chemical deterioration of ammunition brought

need for a Weapons and Ammunitions Disposal (WAD) team

on by poorly met standards within storage depots, additional

in Tajikistan. In April 2009, FSD and Tajikistan’s First Deputy

risk factors exist:

Minister of Defense, Lt. Gen. Ramil Nadirov, met and initiat-

• Storage area defects such as electrical short circuits
• Negligent behavior including dropping ammunition or
smoking in the facility

• Environmental dangers such as extreme temperature
shifts, lightning or fires

ed the WAD project.
Besides conducting munitions disposal, FSD’s other activities in the region include landmine and explosive remnants
of war survey, clearance and land release. FSD’s WAD project is the only Tajik program actively operating in weapons,

In Tajikistan, summer temperatures can reach upward of

small-arms and ammunition disposal and is supported by

50 degrees Celsius (122 degrees Fahrenheit), and the dry cli-

Tajikistan’s border guards, Ministry of Defense (MOD) and

mate increases the likelihood for fires.2

Ministry of Interior (MOI). Its objectives are as follows:

Reducing the number of unplanned munitions explosions

• To train and provide necessary equipment for teams

may require additional training for staff working at stor-

consisting of FSD and MOD staff for the destruction of

age sites. Likewise, constructing new storage facilities and

unserviceable, outdated and redundant conventional

renovating existing structures will eliminate external and

ammunition

environmental threats. Problems related to deteriorating mu-

• To facilitate SA/LW, large-caliber ammunition, aircraft

17.1 | spring 2013 | the journal of ERW and mine action | focus

7

Demolition pit with MANPADS, mortar shells and artillery shells.
Photo courtesy of Artyom Harutyunyan/FSD.

bombs and man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) destruction

• 154,952 rounds of ammunition of 20-mm caliber and
higher were destroyed by using a high explosive attack

• To improve munitions-stockpile security and management through relevant staff trainings

8

The government of the Netherlands funded the first team

method.

• 1,025,155 small arms ammunition from 5.45-mm to
14.5-mm caliber were destroyed in incinerators de-

to conduct WAD operations starting in May 2009 and has con-

signed locally by FSD’s technical staff in Tajikistan.

tinuously assisted the WAD team for nearly three and a half

• 7,180 light weapons and their components were de-

years. Over this period, the Netherlands contributed more
than EU€1,000,000 (US$1,277,300 as of 4 April 2013) to FSD.

stroyed with high pressure hydraulic shears.11
During a 2012 examination of depots throughout the

In 2011 and 2012, the Office of Weapons Removal and

country, Tajikistan’s MOD officers and WAD staff also found

Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Po-

645 anti-personnel mines, which later were destroyed at FSD’s

litical-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) provided Tajikistan with

central demolition site near Dushanbe. Other notable muni-

more than US$2.5 million to support WAD teams and mine

tions were found as well:

$1,691,120. Through fiscal year 2012, the U.S. invested more

• 116 anti-tank mines from depots
• 400 cluster munitions
• 40 MANPADS

than $6.8 million in conventional weapons-destruction

Two refresher courses and three courses in ammunition

action in Tajikistan.

9,10

The total PM/WRA contribution for

Tajikistan in 2011 was US$1 million, and the 2012 total was

(CWD) programs in Tajikistan.

9

safe-handling and explosive-ordnance disposal (EOD) at each
of the three International Mine Action Standards levels were

Program Results

From 1 May 2009 to 31 December 2012, WAD project
teams achieved the following results:
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carried out from 2009–2013. Additionally in 2012, two SA/LW
Cutting Standard Operation Procedures courses were given
to MOI and border guard officers. Altogether, 82 civilians,

25 officers from the MOD Engineering
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“Unplanned Explosions at Muni-

Department, eight officers from MOI

tions Site.” Small Arms Survey.

and five border guard officers attended

http://bit.ly/ZPE0VS. Accessed 25

courses and were successfully accredited

April 2013.

7.

as EOD operators.

“UMES Incidents by Year (1987-

Physical security and stockpile man-

2012).” Small Arms Survey. http://

agement (PSSM) issues continue to pres-

bit.ly/120QQRn. Accessed 26 June

ent serious security concerns to Tajikistan, and FSD strives to support the

2013.
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“Tajikistan.”

FSD.

http://bit.

government in resolving these issues.

ly/10D2eJg. Accessed 25 April

Additionally, the government of Tajiki-

2013.

stan continues to take steps to improve
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“Tajikistan.” To Walk the Earth In

stockpile security. On 3 January 2013,

Safety 11 (July 2012): 24. http://1.

deputies of Majlisi Namoyandagon (Ta-

usa.gov/123fkgY. Accessed 20 June

jikistan’s lower house of parliament)

2013.

ratified a PSSM agreement between Tajikistan and NATO.12 FSD hopes the

10. “Tajikistan.” To Walk the Earth In
Safety 12 (July 2013): 26.

MOD, together with the MOI, will take

11. Program results taken from the

ownership and manage the PSSM proj-

FSD WAD database, Artyom Ha-

ect in the near future; however, no con-

rutyunyan, email correspondence

crete steps to transfer control of the proj-

with author, 7 June 2013.
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